Following months of military restraint, Saudi Arabia on Wednesday joined the US in striking Iran-backed militias in Iraq, marking Riyadh’s first direct military involvement alongside Washington since the Iran war erupted in late February. 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the strikes targeted logistics hubs and weapons depots operated by militias acting under the direction of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 

Saudi officials described the operation as an act of self-defence, accusing Iran-backed groups in Iraq of launching drone attacks against the kingdom’s energy infrastructure earlier this week. 

The Hashed al-Shaabi alliance, also known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces, an umbrella organisation that includes many of Iraq’s pro-Iranian Shia militias, said around 20 of its fighters had been killed. 

The strikes represent a marked departure from Saudi Arabia’s approach over recent months. 

“It’s a very big shift, it looks like the Saudis are getting more openly militarily involved […] after a few months of very severe restraint,” said Toby Matthiesen, senior lecturer in Global Islam at the University of Bristol. 

From restraint to retaliation 

Since the US-Israeli offensive against Iran began on February 28, Saudi Arabia has faced a steady stream of attacks by Tehran and its regional allies. 

Riyadh says Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen have repeatedly targeted Saudi energy facilities. The kingdom accused Tehran of launching almost 100 drones against its infrastructure on March 16 alone. 

Meanwhile, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have stepped up attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, including several strikes on Saudi-linked vessels. The group claimed on Tuesday that it had fired ballistic missiles at a Saudi cargo ship. 

Despite the mounting attacks, Saudi Arabia had until now limited itself to intercepting incoming attacks while relying on US military support. 

“Saudi Arabia portrays themselves as a moderate country. And that also plays out in the way that they are trying to manage the ongoing conflict and the ongoing conflagration in the region,” said Javier Bordon, a researcher in International Relations at Lancaster University.  

The kingdom is seeking not “to pursue escalation, but basically to deter aggression”, he said. 

The cost of restraint

Riyadh’s cautious approach also reflected a broader diplomatic strategy, experts said. 

Over the past few years, the country has sought to rebuild relations with regional rival Iran on the basis that long-term coexistence is preferable to perpetual confrontation. 

That pragmatic calculation culminated in the Chinese-brokered agreement in 2023 to restore diplomatic ties between the two countries. 

The rapprochement, however, did not bring an end to their rivalry. Instead, it continued to play out through their respective allies across the Middle East.  

“The two countries have historically channelled this tension through a broader proxy war involving multiple states and militant groups across the Middle East,” said Kenzy Dessouki, a student at IE University in Madrid who specialises in Saudi-Iran relations.  

What appears to have changed is Riyadh’s assessment of the cost of continued restraint.   

According to Bordon, the shift was the cumulative effect of repeated attacks and growing economic risks. 

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Although Saudi Arabia has been less vulnerable than some Gulf neighbours to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – thanks to its East-West pipeline, which allows oil exports to reach the Red Sea without passing through the Gulf – that advantage may not last.   

Bordon argued that if Houthi pressure were to extend to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Saudi Arabia would face a much more challenging economic environment, with both of its key maritime export routes coming under threat. 

Against that backdrop, Saudi leaders seem to have come to the conclusion that Tehran needed a clearer warning. 

A new front in Iraq  

According to experts, the choice of Iraq was both militarily and politically significant.   

Unlike Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has been militarily involved since 2015, Iraq represents new ground. It also hosts several of the militias accused of attacking Saudi territory. 

Meanwhile, some experts suggested that Iraqi domestic politics may also have played a part. The country’s Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, who was nominated late April, has pledged to bring all armed groups under state control, directly challenging the influence of powerful militias. 

“I think the US and Saudi Arabia, they align in this vision when it comes to reasserting or consolidating the state monopoly […] over the militias,” Bordon said, adding that the strikes represent “a way of signalling their support for that vision”.     

Crucially, Riyadh has avoided striking Iranian territory directly. Dessouki argued that the operation should be seen as a defensive response to attacks by Iran-backed militias rather than as an offensive against Iran itself.  

As long as Saudi Arabia refrains from targeting Iran or formally aligning itself with Washington’s military campaign, she said, the broader dynamics of the conflict remain largely unchanged.  

“It is more a signal of power rather than an explicit commitment to the war,” she added. 

Saudi Arabia’s calculation appears to be that a limited show of force may ultimately help prevent the war from spreading. By demonstrating that attacks on its territory now carry a direct military cost, Riyadh hopes to deter Iran and its regional allies from launching further strikes against the kingdom. 

But whether this calculated risk will pay off remains uncertain. Some analysts warn that joining US strikes risks drawing Saudi Arabia deeper into regional confrontation as the conflict continues to broaden. 

This article has been adapted from the original in French by Natasha LI.